THE ARCHITECTURE OF EU COMPANY LAW PROVISIONS PROTECTING WHO, WHAT AND HOW? by Mélon, Lela
European Scientific Journal July 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
170 
THE ARCHITECTURE OF EU COMPANY LAW 
PROVISIONS 
PROTECTING WHO, WHAT AND HOW? 
 
 
 
Lela Mélon, MA 
University of Aberdeen, Scotland 
University Pompeu Fabra, Spain 
 
 
Abstract 
 The stakeholder-oriented nature of EU company law can be observed 
in the case of public or private limited liability companies. In the case of the 
former,  protection of shareholders  also comes in the forefront and it can be 
found  through the information model legislation,  demanding all relevant 
information to be presented to the shareholders, on the basis of which the 
shareholders take on the responsibility for their decisions. This shift of 
responsibility for protection from legislative provisions in the hands of 
company law actors can be also observed in the case of provisions addressed 
to creditors , albeit in limited form. The interplay of the two legislative 
approaches  - information based Anglo-American approach and (minimum) 
harmonization Continental approach can be seen throughout the body of EU 
company law, including CJEU case law, but the use of one or another does 
not always depend  on the EU legislative policy. The lack of harmonization 
of some basic company law principles across the national laws of Member 
States contributes to these shifts of legislative approaches and it does not 
always coherently follow the aims and goals of EU legislature concerning 
the internal market and international competitiveness of European 
businesses. In particular, competitiveness that is based on comparative 
advantages and not merely on size is at the present moment not promoted at 
the EU level. A company that focuses on internal growth and decides to 
change its legal form to public limited liability company faces a vast shift in 
applicable EU company law provisions that entail high costs, not providing a 
visible initiative for businesses to undertake such path. A shift in policy 
considerations would be advisable to achieve the goal that arose in the last 
decades at the EU level: since internal market is today insured, international 
competitiveness is next on the agenda and the same policy considerations as 
they were provided in the 1950s cannot hold today in the changed 
circumstances. 
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Sui Generis nature of EU company law and the influence of related 
provisions on its protective nature  
 
 The EU company law is sui generis type of company law as far as its 
composition and substance is concerned and EU codex in this field is simply 
not available. Moreover, its exact substance is determined by national laws 
of 28 EU Member States, which furthers the diversity of protective 
instruments and policies. In addition, the CJEU case law and influence of 
rules in other fields of EU law (capital markets law, corporate taxation law) 
add its flavor to this equation and at the first glance, deducting a clear picture 
on its protective nature is close to impossible.  
 All these rules were not created with unified policy considerations; 
three phases can be distinguished historically in the EU company law 
creation[1], creating a net of protective provisions building a policy of 
protection. But the protective nature spontaneously developed in these 
phases does not necessarily coincide with this raw phase division. E.g. in the 
first phase, ending in 1990s, the pro-active role of the EU legislator could be 
observed and majority of the company law directives were at least envisaged 
if not passed[2], and this may point in the direction of Continental (German) 
style of corporate legislation[3] with the  protection of shareholders, 
creditors and others, but a closer look at the enacted provisions shows 
different tendencies. Even thought the First Company Law Directive 
encompasses substantive rules on the power of representation of the organs 
and the validity of the transactions entered into by companies with limited 
liability, the compulsory disclosure provisions seem to be its center of 
gravity. But the information function of corporate law is not a characteristic 
of Germany style of company legislation; it is more typical for Anglo-
American corporate law theory of company as nexus of contracts[4] and it 
puts more responsibility on shareholders and creditors to act on the basis of 
the information given than the Continental-style legislation does. This 
interaction of both models is seen throughout the EU company legislation 
and it creates a sui generis protective nature of EU company law as its own 
EU-style legislation. Determining this spontaneously created protective 
policy contained in the EU company law legislation is the aim of research 
that surpasses the scope  of this article.  
 In substance, the EU never developed a truly EU nature of protection 
of ―members and others‖. The aim of EU company law has always been the 
creation and reinforcement of the Internal Market, a task carried through the 
primary EU legislation with the provisions on the freedom of 
establishment[5] and the famous Article 50(2)(g) TFEU giving EU the 
competence to regulate the field of company law by ―[c]oordinating to the 
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necessary extent the safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of 
members and others, are required by Member States of companies or 
firms…”. What has been regulated therefore through EU‘s facilitation of the 
freedom of establishment in secondary EU legislation were the safeguards 
and protective measures already determined at the level of national Member 
States. Even though these policy considerations belong to national Member 
States, the sum of them ultimately created EU‘s own policy considerations, 
even if only incidentally. Those policy considerations will be extracted and 
gathered throughout further research.  
 For this spontaneously built EU protective policy to be determined 
with precision, the interpretation of the freedom of establishment in CJEU 
case law is of relevance; not only in company law cases, but also in tax law 
cases. CJEU interpretations of the secondary EU legislation add to this 
equation.  
 Since EU company law instruments in majority regulate public 
limited liability companies[6], the sphere of law that regulates their legal 
position from another point of view needs to be included in the analysis, e.g. 
parts of capital market law. Indeed, since public limited liability companies 
need to comply also with the rules of EU capital market law[7], their conduct 
on the market and their decisions on the form of the company and content of 
the business they are carrying on depends also on those highly-harmonized 
capital market rules[8]. At first glance those rules are in majority offering to 
(potential) shareholders and creditors vast information that can enable 
informed decision-making on their side[9], which suggests that the 
provisions on this legislative field lean more in the direction of Anglo-
American style of company regulation. Whether this proves true or not is a 
matter of further research, but if so, this would suggest that the regulation of 
public limited liability companies is leaning more in the direction of Anglo-
American policy of protection in company law.  
 On the other hand, the regulation of private limited liability 
companies is so scarce in the EU that indications as to the nature of 
regulation of this type of companies needs to be deducted from whatever 
regulation exists at the EU level, again combined with national company law 
legislation. This is a difficult task, since the EU today encompasses 28 
Member States with divergent national company laws, in majority non-
harmonized. Since in EU (in contrast with USA and to a certain extent UK) 
small and medium sized enterprises are prevailing[10], in majority in the 
form of limited liability company, here legal standards on control 
transactions or investor protection are not a part of the core principles. In this 
field, different national solutions need to be explored and summed up to a 
general EU-wide protective nature in the case of private limited liability 
companies.  
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 The summary of all of these protective measures contained in 
different building segments of EU company law creates and represents the 
sui generis EU protective nature. This nature was arrived to by agreement of 
EU Member States and was carried out in the EU throughout decades, so it is 
imaginable to envisage the ability of applying such protective model also to 
new measures and directions in EU company law. The competitiveness of 
EU businesses worldwide should be seen as the next objective of EU 
company law, after ensuring the creation of the Internal Market, and at its 
best, remodeling some of the failed Company Law Directives under these 
―common protective principles‖ might actually bring them to life. A shift in 
EU company law policy is needed and this time it should focus on small and 
medium size enterprises as the cornerstone of EU business reality and the 
basis for its future development. 
  
[1] Pro-active harmonisation phase from 1968 until 1990s, more Anglo-American oriented 
era until the financial crisis in 2008 and post-financial crisis law making oriented more 
towards Continental law models 
[2] In the period from year 1968 until 1990 First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, 
Eight and Eleventh Company Law Directives were passed, only the Fifth Company Law 
Directive on the structure of public limited liability company and Ninth Company Law 
Directive on the law of groups failed and were not enacted until today
[3] See more in J.J. du Plessis et al., German Corporate Governance in International and 
European Context, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
[4] See more in Bratton, William W., "The "Nexus of Contracts" Corporation: A Critical 
Appraisal" (1989). Faculty Scholarship. Paper 839. 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/839
[5] Articles 49 and 54 TFEU
[6] At this point comments on the feasibility of such policy orientation to regulate in 
majority public limited liability companies are omitted, since they deserve a deeper analysis, 
not appropriate at this point 
[7] More strongly harmonized field of EU law than company law 
[8]See more in Grundmann, Stefan; Möslein, Florian (2007) European company law. 
Organization, finance and capital markets. Antwerpen, Holmes Beach, Fla.: Intersentia; 
distribution for North America : Gaunt (Ius communitatis series, v. 1), p. 3-9
[9] E.g. the detailed demands for the contents of prospectuses in the Directive 2003/71/EC 
on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
trading, as regards the implementing powers conferred on the Commission, OJ L 345, 
31.12.2003
[10]Roth, Günter H.; Kindler, Peter The spirit of corporate law. Core principles of corporate 
law in continental Europe, p. 5
[11] The failed Fifth and Ninth Company Law Directives can be remodeled on the basis of 
these EU protective principles an d presented as such to the Member States, which already 
built in the past the protective nature of EU company law as it stands today, making it 
politically more acceptable to move forward in the field of EU Company Law programme 
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I. 
Are the Treaties alone revealing on the interests protected in EU? 
 a) Articles 49 and 50(2)(g) TFEU  
Even if the Article 49 TFEU brings about the freedom of establishment 
as the cornerstone of the EU company law and Article 50(2)(g) TFEU 
provides a tool to EU legislator to legislate in this field, EU legislator still 
has to act in this field in accordance with the principle of conferral[1], the 
principle of subsidiarity[2] and the principle of proportionality[3]. This in 
turn means that the protected interests cannot be determined solely at the 
level of the EU law, but must be developed in accordance with national 
company laws within the scope of EU competences to the extent necessary to 
achieve the goal of EU legislation in the field of company law. Already on 
the basis of the freedom of establishment therefore the EU legislator is 
limited as to what interests he may find worthy protecting at the EU level. 
Majority of the EU company law instruments were enacted on the legal 
basis of Article 50(2)(g) TFEU, under which the Council and European 
Parliament act by means of Directives for ―…[c]oordination of safeguards 
which, for the protection of the interests of members and others, are required 
by Member States of companies or firms with a view to making such 
safeguards equivalent throughout the EU.‖ The wording of the this legal 
basis itself suggests that the safeguards necessary for protection of ―members 
and others‖ already exist at the level of Member States and the EU role is to 
make those equivalent throughout the EU. What is obvious though from this 
legal provision is the fact that the EU never envisaged company law as solely 
protecting shareholders (―members‖), but that the stakeholders are to be 
taken into account too (―others‖). 
 b) Articles 114 and 352 TFEU as a possible tool to develop EU's own 
protective policy? 
 Besides Article 50(2)(g) TFEU, Articles 114 and 352 TFEU have 
also been used as a legal basis for EU acts in the field of company law. The 
EU competence under Article 114 TFEU is based on the approximation of 
Member States‘ rules having as their objective the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market. Here the EU competence seems to be 
broader; the scope of Member States‘ rules that EU legislation can 
approximate is broader and also the ―approximation‖ seems a more vague 
term than ―making safeguards equivalent‖. Under these conditions the EU 
seems to determine more freely whose interest are to be protected through 
company law in that it decides to which standard it is going to approximate 
those Member States‘ rules. On the other hand, the Tobacco Advertising 
I[4]case made it clear that legislating under this article requires that the 
national rules on the topic must differ substantially and that the general and 
complementary EU powers[5] cannot be used to regulate a matter falling 
European Scientific Journal July 2015 /SPECIAL/ edition   ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
175 
clearly within the ambit of more specific provision. Moreover, the second 
paragraph of Article 114 TFEU already excludes from the ambit of this 
article the rights and interests of the employees. So on the basis of this 
article, the EU legislation could only express its preferences on the 
protection of shareholders, creditors and third persons, to the exclusion of 
employees. 
 Another solution for expressing EU protective nature seems to be 
offered by Article 352 TFEU, under which the EU legal forms were 
created[6]. This article is intended to fill the competence gap where no 
specific provisions of the Treaty confer on the EU institutions the power to 
act and such powers are necessary to enable the EU to carry out its functions 
to attain one of the objectives of the Treaty[7]. Since Article 50(2)(g) TFEU 
represents such specific provision for enacting the protective measures for 
―members and others‖ in EU company law, this legal basis can hardly be 
useful for the EU to elaborate on its own protective EU company law 
provisions. 
c) The power of the openness of Article 50(1) TFEU 
 On the contrary, what could be used for the EU to determine its 
priorities in protection mechanism of EU company law is Article 50(1) 
TFEU. As the CJEU already stated in Diahatsu[8], Article 50(2)(g) TFEU 
only sets out a non-exhaustive list of measures to be taken in order to attain 
freedom of establishment within the meaning of Article 50(1) TFEU. Since 
Article 50(1) TFEU confers on the Council and European Parliament the 
power to adopt directives to attain freedom of establishment, the EU 
legislator (limited by the three principles mentioned at the beginning of the 
paragraph) can enact measures promoting legal certainty and building 
confidence if such measures lift hindrances to companies exercising their 
freedom of establishment. This article has already been used in the adoption 
of the Takeover Directive[9], in which the hindrance was seen in 
impediments ―to the acquisition of shares of an existing company‖ 
(protecting (potential) shareholders) and in the adoption of the Shareholder 
Rights Directive[10], where the effective shareholder control was seen as a 
prerequisite to sound corporate governance and as helping to attain the 
freedom of establishment[11]. Therefore, if ―hindrances‖ were already 
interpreted in such a broad way, these might also be represented by 
insufficient protection of members and third parties, leading to the race to the 
bottom by Member States, as recognized in 2002 Report on a modern 
regulatory framework for company law in Europe[12]. Under these 
conditions the EU might set the bar of sufficient protection as high as it 
deems necessary (principle of proportionality) to ensure the efficient exercise 
of companies‘ freedom of establishment across the EU. The architecture of 
the protection envisaged until today, as it will be revealed by further research 
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of the substance of secondary EU legislation, and under the measures 
envisaged in the near future, will reveal the protective preferences that could 
be pursued through the means of this article for creation of proper sui generis 
EU protective policy in the field of EU law.  
 
CJEU interpretation on the freedom of establishment as an influence  
 As far as the CJEU decision making is in question, its contribution to 
the developments in the field of EU company law is undeniable. Not only did 
it interpret the secondary EU company law legislation and its provisions, but 
it also interpreted multitude of national legal measures on the basis of 
primary EU legislation (especially the freedom of establishment) in multiple 
fields of EU law, not solely in pure EU company law cases. 
 For the purpose of this research, the CJEU‘s decision-making can be 
divided in three groups: its interpretation of the Treaty-based freedom of 
establishment in company law cases (mainly when judging on Member 
State‘s refusal to allow the move of company‘s de facto head office), its 
interpretation of the freedom of establishment in tax law cases and last but 
not least, its interpretation of secondary legislation in the field of EU 
company law. While the first two are going to be debated in the scope of this 
paper, the last one is going to be omitted at this point, since it presupposes a 
thorough review of the content of secondary EU acts in the field of company 
law and is therefore too early for its analysis.  
 a) Does the CJEU take position on whose interests to protect with EU 
company law? 
 The most renowned and quoted EU company law cases date from the 
year 2000 on, coinciding with the second phase of the development of EU 
company law, in which more tendency toward Anglo-American model can 
be noticed. While generally new ideas and more hands-off approach 
developed at the level of EU legislature, the CJEU on the other hand made 
sure that the Member States are allowed to use their jurisdiction in EU 
company law only to the extent and in a way as compatible with the Treaty 
based freedom of establishment and with applicable company law directives. 
 Centros[13] showed that even when EU citizens use their freedom of 
establishment solely to choose the most lenient national law to establish a 
company, the Member State with less lenient company law provisions (in 
this case Denmark with its minimum capital requirements) cannot prohibit 
the establishment of such a company. CJEU explained that a Member State 
is allowed to restrict the freedom of establishment only if there is no other 
way of countering fraud or protecting creditors. CJEU here specifically 
stated that the creditor protection is compatible with the spirit of EU 
company law but that it has to be carried out in the least intrusive manner 
regarding the freedom of establishment. This statement combined with the 
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fact that the CJEU also reminded Member States in this judgment of their 
option of adopting EU harmonizing legislation in this area of company law 
shows EU general acceptance of the possibility of EU wide protective policy 
in this field, obviously including not only shareholders, but also creditor 
protection. By the inborn nature of the Internal Market, if these safeguards 
would be harmonized throughout the EU, the question of breach of freedom 
of establishment would not emerge at all. In this case, regarding the content 
of creditor protection under such non-harmonized field, CJEU saw as a less 
invasive measure ―…[m]aking it possible in law for public creditors to 
obtain the necessary guarantees.” By this statement, the CJEU took a stand 
that national legislation can perform the information function, but that the 
precautions that are to be taken are the responsibility of the creditors, which 
must inform themselves about the fact that the company is regulated by 
another set of rules, different from the national ones. These facts seem to be 
indicating that the EU is inclined to the Anglo-American system (based on 
the information function) due to the lack of EU harmonization in this field 
but that it would prefer the Continental approach of mandatory provisions, 
for which Member States‘ agreement would be needed. 
 Überseering[14]decision built upon Centros and brought more legal 
certainty for creditors and shareholders across the EU since it clearly 
determined the obligation of Member States to recognize the legal standing 
of companies lawfully formed in another Member State. This ensures the 
enforcement of creditors‘ and shareholders‘ rights and therefore their 
practical utility. Their protection under EU law would otherwise be left 
without substance. Moreover, Inspire Art[15] reminded Member States that 
no additional conditions can be required from company lawfully 
incorporated in another Member State in order for it to do business on the 
territory of this Member State. CJEU reiterated that by Member States not 
taking harmonizing actions in the field of protective measures, they have to 
accept that the companies doing business on their territory might have lower 
protective standards regulating companies‘ conduct and that in this case 
shareholders and creditors alone need to inform themselves on the content of 
this foreign law. Again, this solution seems to correspond more to the Anglo-
American model but again it seems that only as a consequence of the lack of 
common EU standards of protection and not an EU preference.  
 When we take a look at Cartesio[16] decision, such limits are clearly 
shown in the fact that a Member State is allowed to condition the application 
of its law to a company on the fact that the company has to retain its 
registered office on its territory. The Member State therefore does not need 
to take on the burden of applying its protective provisions on a company 
with no real connection to this State. The equilibrium of protective 
provisions in this Member State is therefore taken into account and once 
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again here the CJEU reiterates the fact that this issue needs further legislative 
measures at the EU level. 
 In Sevic[17], on the other hand, CJEU explained that company 
transformation operations constitute a ―[p]articular method of exercise of the 
freedom of establishment…”and placed the protective role of company law 
in the Member State in which the new, restructured company is registered. 
Once again, due to the lack of harmonization in this field, the creditors, 
shareholders and also employees of the company under reorganization are all 
of a sudden facing a different set of protective rules. This can be either 
beneficial or detrimental to them, but the fact is that it does not contribute to 
legal certainty and it does have an impact on decision-making of ―members 
and others‖, which shows that also in this point of view, harmonization 
would have been beneficial. Such uncertainty attributes to reluctance to 
broaden one's business across the EU to the detriment of EU competitiveness 
on the world markets.  
b) The outcome under CJEU wording in company law cases  
What can be seen from this brief overview of CJEU case-law in the field 
of EU company law is that the protection envisaged for ―members and 
others‖ in national company laws of different Member States stays 
untouched if it is in compliance with the freedom of establishment and with 
secondary EU legislative measures, in principle ensuring information flow 
sufficient enough for those ―members and others‖ to know what their level of 
protection in a particular case is. The CJEU is consistently reminding the 
Member States that further harmonization measures in this field are 
advisable, which shows that the current orientation towards Anglo-American 
information model is not a preferred path under its view. The tendency to 
what the majority of the Member States is and was historically inclined, the 
Continental model of mandatory provisions, can be noticed. The only crucial 
thing missing in achieving this common protective policy is what further 
research on this topic will do: a comprehensive overview of the protective 
company law provisions as they stand today and as envisaged in the 
proposed future measures. 
c) The correlation between the protective role of EU company law and 
CJEU decisions in taxation of companies and shareholders  
The Court has dealt extensively with the interpretation of the freedom of 
establishment also in preliminary rulings on corporate taxation. Its decisions 
on corporate income tax also brought landmark judgments on the equal 
treatment of branches and subsidiaries, the cross-border compensation of 
losses and on the taxation of cross-border services. Achievement of the 
internal market was in the forefront; the decisions on the taxation of 
individual and corporate shareholders also contributed to it[18]. Although the 
Court is not expressively dealing in these cases with the question of 
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protection of ―members and others‖ in company law, its decisions 
nonetheless bear consequences on the nature and/or level of protection 
already contained in provisions on EU company law, since it creates a 
guarantee to a certain extent of the same tax treatment for companies 
deciding to do business cross-borders as if they would be doing business in 
one Member State. Moreover, their freedom of secondary establishment is 
today a matter of settled case-law[19]. What needs to be taken a look at is 
how this influences ―members and others‖ in these companies. 
d) The Court acts proactively in the field of taxation  
 To understand the nature of the influence of these decisions on 
―members and others‖, the structure of case law on corporate taxation and on 
taxation of corporate shareholders is revealing in the sense that it shows the 
efforts of the Court to ensure a level-playing field among purely internal and 
cross-border situations in the EU and by doing so ensuring even protection 
and opportunities for ―members and others‖ across the EU. 
 As far as the case law on corporate taxation is concerned, the CJEU 
decisions on the basis of the freedom of establishment usually demand equal 
treatment of resident and non-resident secondary establishments[20] if they 
are in ―comparable situation‖ from the side of home as well as host 
State[21]. For instance, what is demanded from the side of the EU law in the 
host Member State is that it must treat a branch by a non-resident company 
in the same way as a branch of domestic company. Moreover, the host 
Member State must also treat equally subsidiaries of non-resident parent 
companies and those of resident parent companies[22]. This first and 
foremost brings advantages to companies, which can choose the most 
appropriate form of business-making in other Member States. If differential 
tax treatment cannot influence decision-making in terms of where to start or 
continue the business of the company in question, the business can expand 
more rapidly. Not only that; since more burdensome tax provisions for cross-
border business making are limited to exceptional cases by CJEU case 
law[23], this guarantees that cross-border business making will not be tax-
vise disadvantageous for the company and it allows it to spread its business 
and growth faster and more efficiently than in case where such 
discrimination would be allowed. Not only can this bring higher return to the 
shareholders, which will incentivize them to support such cross-border 
growth, it can also reassure the creditors about their payment, since more 
financial assets are kept in the company that decides to spread cross-borders, 
than it would be the case if tax discrimination would be allowed. In this case, 
even higher employee protection can be envisaged in terms of more 
predictable and stable business-making, bringing possibly with it more stable 
employment. All in all, the business growth in the EU becomes more ―user-
friendly‖, enabling the EU world-wide competitiveness to become reality. 
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 The home State is also obliged to treat branches in other Member 
States equally as branches created on its territory, if all the possibilities to 
carry-over the losses in the host Member State have been exhausted[24]. In 
this field therefore timing differences can be detrimental to foreign 
established entities and due to this flexible CJEU decision-making, 
shareholders of these companies can be dissuaded from creating branches in 
other Member States, in turn influencing not only the Internal Market but 
more specifically investment decisions of the company in question. Here 
shareholders cannot use the benefit of limited liability throughout the EU 
efficiently and the creditors might be more reluctant to enter into the 
business with foreign branch exposed to the option of non-carrying-on of its 
losses.  
 Since subsidiaries differ from branches in that the former have its 
own legal personality, the CJEU case law on foreign subsidiaries differs 
from the one on branches. In case of subsidiaries, inequality between 
subsidiaries of a ―home‖ company and subsidiaries of a ―foreign‖ company 
is unjustified under the freedom of establishment[25]. Besides the cases 
where this restriction on the freedom of establishment pursues legitimate 
objective and is justified by imperative reasons in public interest[26], these 
decision again create incentives for shareholders to expand the company‘s 
business and more willingness from the side of creditors to enter into the 
business with a subsidiary of a ―foreign‖ company, due to higher legal 
certainty in the field of company taxation as to what the financial position of 
such subsidiary is. The common EU business market and market for 
corporate control as well as general cross-border operations is also 
incentivized through financial encouragement, attributing to the use of the 
protective provisions offered by the EU legislature for EU wide operations. 
 e) Shareholder protection strengthened: a specific CJEU agenda or 
simply a result of special shareholder role in public limited companies?  
 The CJEU case law also touched upon taxation of shareholders across 
the EU. Before analyzing the decisions, one may ask if the shareholders 
benefit from these CJEU judgments more than the ―others‖ in company law, 
e.g. creditors and employees. But since neither of those two categories are 
taxed on their participation in a company (besides income tax of employees, 
not connected with corporate taxation), their exclusion from separate CJEU 
decision-making seems natural. 
 Regarding outbound dividends, the CJEU took under scrutiny the 
withholding tax systems as well as tax credit systems. If a Member State 
levies a withholding tax only on dividends paid to foreign parents and not to 
domestic parents, this constitutes a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment[27]. Subsidiaries are therefore taxed the same no matter where 
their parent company comes from, which places shareholders of such 
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subsidiaries on the same level and reinforces the incentives of their 
shareholders to keep and/or create business cross-borders. The decisions on 
tax credit systems follow the same line; when a subsidiary of foreign 
company is liable to tax on its dividends, then a subsidiary of home company 
needs to be treated the same (both taxed or both exempted)[28].  
 A Member State is also not allowed to provide for exemptions only 
for dividends received from a domestic company but not for the ones 
received from a foreign company[29]. Although this decision was taken on 
the basis of the free movement of capital[30] guaranteed under the Treaty, it 
protects the financial interests of shareholders in multi-national companies 
operating through subsidiaries in multiple Member States and therefore their 
incentives for cross-border business making. The benefit of limited liability 
of such shareholders is therefore better utilized. The same goes for the EU 
prohibition of determining a different tax rate on foreign and domestic 
inbound dividends[31]. 
 Shareholders‘ incentive to invest in cross-border business and to 
maximize the benefit of their limited liability under company law is 
furthermore protected by the CJEU decisions on the tax treatment of 
acquisition, holding and alienation of shares. Shareholders of EU companies 
which are resident in other Member States may not be excluded from tax 
advantages linked to the acquisition of shares[32] and the mere ownership of 
foreign shares may not be taxed in a discriminatory manner[33]. The 
possibility of deducting the costs connected with participations in foreign 
companies must be given, if such possibility exists for participation in 
domestic companies[34], not to hinder the creation of subsidiaries in other 
Member States. Moreover, since capital gains are often taxable in the 
country of residence of the shareholder at the moment of the disposal of the 
shares, this can lead EU residents to transfer their residence before selling 
their participations to benefit from a more favorable tax regime. But this still 
does not allow Member States to tax the shareholders upon the move on 
unrealized gains and it is said to be contrary to the freedom of 
establishment[35]. This brings additional possibilities for the shareholders to 
pursue their financial goals and ameliorate their financial positions also by 
the means of their own actions. Does this fact show CJEU inclination 
towards the interests of shareholders? I think that this deduction would be a 
bit far-fetched; the CJEU intention is to keep the Internal Market intact and 
to this extent in this particular case, the shareholders‘ interests are 
incidentally further promoted.  
f) And the winner under CJEU case law is...the Internal Market 
 As seen, CJEU decisions in this field facilitate the freedom of 
establishment of companies and the creation and development of the Internal 
Market. Although this first and foremost benefits the EU companies in 
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general, it also facilitates shareholders‘ benefit of limited liability and 
provides incentives for them to be involved in cross-border EU companies. 
This case law provides the cross-border businesses in EU with a higher level 
of legal certainty, which might encourage creditors to engage in business 
with companies across the EU to a greater extent than they would before the 
CJEU clarifications were made. The internal as well as external growth of 
businesses is therefore facilitated, bringing prospects for further 
developments in this direction. 
 Moreover, with its decisions on shareholder taxation, CJEU further 
protected incentives of EU shareholders to invest across the EU and to 
maximize the utility of the benefits granted under EU as well as national 
company laws.  
 In the end, CJEU case law in the field of taxation does not bring new 
protective measures for ―members and others‖ in the EU law, but it does 
make the already existing protective measures effective and used to their full 
potential across the EU, which is an important feature of the building process 
of EU protective policy in EU law. Without such firm interpretative actions 
on the side of the Court the provisions of EU law could be rendered empty 
and their wording just an unexploited option on a paper.  
 
Secondary EU legislation as the protective substance at the EU level  
 With no systematic EU company law, in order to be able to ascertain 
its protective nature, its individual provisions need to be looked at, including 
their amendments and subsequent interpretations of CJEU case law. 
 Looking at the historical developments of the legislative process on 
this subject matter, one can notice that the first idea must have been one of 
harmonization, since all the envisaged EU company law directives carry 
numbering in their names: from the First to the Fourteenth Company Law 
Directive[36]. This phase of EU company law can be limited in time as from 
1968[37] until around 2002, the time when the Commission created its 2002 
Communication[38]. Out of the fourteen envisaged measures five were not 
successful in this period: the Thirteenth Company Law Directive on 
Takeover Bids, the Tenth Company Law Directive on Cross-Border 
Mergers, the Fourteenth Company Law Directive on Cross-Border Transfer 
of the Registered Office, the Fifth Company Law Directive on the structure 
of public limited liability companies and the Ninth Company Law Directive 
on group law. The latter three were indeed never enacted. On this basis, 
while searching for the nature of protective measures in the EU company 
law, the measures enacted (and as amended) should be first taken into 
account. Moreover, does the jump from the first phase of harmonization in 
the second, post-year 2002 phase of soft law-making, model rules, battle 
among the Anglo-American and Continental law and competition among 
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national company laws show also a switch in the EU company law policy of 
protection? And last but not least, in the last phase of EU company law, 
triggered by the world-wide financial crisis, brought in the forefront more 
national protectionism and at the same time more interventionism also from 
the side of the EU, especially in the financial sector, the fueling source for 
EU companies. Was this change brought about by heavier inclination 
towards the Continental law and its mandatory law on protection of 
stakeholders? Or was this just a reactionary move to contain the damage 
done by too liberal legislature in the field of company law outside the EU? 
 a) The protective nature as build by the existing secondary legislation  
 Although at first glance the First Company Law Directive[39] is 
more information oriented due to its disclosure demands, a closer look 
reveals that it contains multiple minimum protection standards in its 
mandatory provisions[40] that lean more towards the Continental system of 
protection. It is not oriented towards shareholders‘ protection but more 
towards third party protection; the data demanded with Article 2(1) of this 
Directive are more about the protection of creditors and potential 
shareholders, since the shareholders are in any case those naming the 
directors or are gathering all these information through the general meeting. 
Since the publication of all accounts was demanded for public and private 
limited liability companies in all Member States, this provides additional 
protection for company‘s creditors and potential shareholders. And last but 
not least, the demanded disclosure of information about directors under this 
article is aimed straight at protection of third parties. The protection of third 
parties is moreover seen in the first paragraph of Article 9, determining that 
ultra-vires transactions bind the company. ECJ itself made clear in 
Rabobank[41] that the mandatory provisions for protection of third parties 
are preferred in the scope of this Directive, while stating that Article 9(1) is 
lex specialis to Article 3(5), which determines the disclosure requirements. 
Under this Directive, the reasons for nullity of company are extremely 
limited and by this shareholders‘ limited liability and creditors‘ interests are 
protected. The nature of the First Council Directive changed slightly with the 
amending Directive 2003/58/EC, which brought about making company 
information more easily and rapidly accessible for interested parties through 
electronic means[42]. Emphasis under the amended Directive is more on its 
information function, but the majority of the Directive still contains 
mandatory rules on content of the disclosure, which is also visible in the fact 
that in case of discrepancy between the original and the voluntary 
registration in additional languages, third parties may still rely on the 
voluntary registration if they were not aware about the existence of the 
original version[43]. Furthermore, the interpretation of CJEU of Article 6 
shows this continental law nature of protection of third parties even clearly. 
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In Diahatsu[44] it ruled that a Member State is not allowed to restrict the 
members or creditors of a company, the central works council or the 
company‘s works council the right to apply for imposition of the national 
penalty in the event of failure by a company to fulfill the obligation of 
disclosure of annual accounts. The enforcement of the provisions of the First 
Council Directive is therefore essential and the possibility of demanding 
such enforcement must be given to shareholders, creditors and employees, as 
interpreted by the CJEU.   
 The Second Council Directive[45], although focused only on public 
limited liability companies[46], seems also to be closer to exhaustive code 
than a minimum standard, since Member States can supplement its rules by 
stricter provisions only where express authorization to such extent has been 
given in the Directive. Moreover, as CJEU made clear in Pafitis et 
al.[47]that the Second Council Directive remains applicable to companies in 
financial difficulties even if subject to special collective liquidation or 
rejuvenation procedures even if the company‘s shareholders have been 
temporarily divested of their powers. Therefore the main focus of this 
Directive is not the information function but mandatory provisions for all 
public limited liability companies in the EU (Continental model). The main 
protective focus seems to be on the potential shareholders and creditors, to 
that extent the following provisions need to be mentioned: Article 5 on the 
number of members of a company, payment for shares in Article 9, valuation 
of non-cash consideration in Article 10, serious loss of capital in Article 17, 
maintenance of capital in Articles 15 to 24a, limited acquisition by a 
company of its own shares in Articles 19 and 22 and finally reduction in 
capital in Articles 30 to 39 of the Second Directive. The shareholders of a 
company seem to be limited in their actions and not in the forefront of the 
Directive‘s protection, since under Article 15(1) the amount of possible 
distribution to shareholders is limited.  
 The Third[48] and Sixth[49] Council Directive on the other hand, 
dealing respectively with national mergers and divisions, seem to be more 
information-oriented, as under Anglo-American legislative approach. It 
contains mandatory provisions in majority ensuring information rights to 
shareholders to be able to make an informed and timely decision on the 
merger/division at the general meeting[50]. Draft terms of these operations 
need to be published at least a month before the general meeting to decide on 
the operation[51] and two sets of reports on these draft reports need to be 
provided: one from the boards of all the companies involved and one from 
the side of experts appointed by national administrative or judicial authority. 
Nevertheless, both Directives contain mandatory rules of substance too; the 
majority needed for the decision taken at the general meeting, shareholders‘ 
rights of inspection and the conditions where it is allowed to omit the general 
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meeting. Moreover, protection of creditors whose claims ante-date, but have 
not fallen due by the publication of the draft terms demands such mandatory 
provisions[52]. Since division entails more risks for creditors than a merger, 
additional protection is provided for them in the form of joint and several 
liability of the recipient companies if the creditors have not obtained 
satisfaction[53]. For protection of ‗members and others‘, Member States 
must also determine civil liability of members of the company‘s organ for 
misconduct in a merger or division and for the misconduct of experts 
responsible for drawing the report. The nullity of mergers and divisions is 
moreover subject to strict conditions contained in both Directives[54]. The 
general picture on these two directives is therefore reinforced protection for 
current shareholders and current creditors in a partially Continental and 
partially Anglo-American legislative approach. 
 In turn, the Fourth[55], Seventh[56] and Eighth[57] Council 
Directives will be examined together, since they are highly interconnected 
and they follow the same protective pattern. The Eighth Council Directive 
has been enacted in order for the Fourth and the Seventh Council Directive 
not to have limited effect due to divergent qualifications of auditors across 
the Member States. This Directive follows the Continental approach and in 
Articles 3 to 19 determines the conditions for Member States‘ approval of 
auditors and requires publicity of information on such auditors in Article 22, 
and by doing so protecting potential and actual shareholders and creditors. 
The Seventh Directive builds on the provisions of the Fourth Council 
Directive on annual accounts, following the same principles contained 
therein and determining the conditions in which for the sake of clarity and 
‗true and fair view‘ consolidated accounts must be drawn up[58], while 
retaining the protective nature of the Fourth Council Directive. The Fourth 
Council Directive itself is in fact a compromise between the prescriptive 
continental approach[59] and pragmatic and flexible Anglo-American 
approach of accounting principles being subject to a general requirement of 
true and fair view[60]. Even though the CJEU has stated multiple times that 
the principle of ‗true and fair view‘ was a primary objective of this 
Directive[61], this seems to be only the umbrella principle which is to be 
carried out by means of prescriptive provisions, further defining its content. 
The prevalence of the Continental approach can be observed through Article 
31(1) on valuation on the prudent basis, Article 2(6) which provides that this 
Directive contains only minimum standards and the detailed prescription of 
the content of the annual accounts throughout the Directive. Those 
provisions protect primarily potential shareholders and potential creditors, 
which through obligatory publication of required annual accounts gain the 
necessary information to take an informed decision. This transparency 
increases general trust in the EU market and EU companies, attracts foreign 
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investments and ensures a level playing field among EU Member States‘ 
companies, since their annual reports become comparable.  
 The Eleventh Council Directive[62] on disclosure by branches is 
protecting third parties through (limited) disclosure; it must disclose 
information with a reference to the register of the company of which the 
branch is part. By the additional disclosure on its power of representation, its 
name and the legal form and any winding up or insolvency proceedings the 
creditors in the state of the branch are additionally protected. The nature of 
this Directive is closer to Anglo-American approach, since it is focused 
strictly on its information function and it puts the responsibility of protection 
on the protected parties themselves. On the other hand, in the Twelfth 
Council Directive[63] on single-member private limited companies, 
creditors‘ and shareholders‘ protection in not in the forefront; its purpose is 
more to offer additional means of encouragement for the creation and 
development of small and medium-sized companies. The protective 
measures under this Directive are completely in the hands of Member 
States[64]. 
 The Stock Exchange Law Directive[65] on the other hand is in 
majority containing minimum harmonization rules to the benefit of investors; 
current and potential shareholders. It is meant to build up investor confidence 
through determining a body of mandatory rules for all the Member States. 
While the rules on admission to listing are determining the minimum 
conditions for equivalent protection for investors at the EU level, the rules on 
listing particulars are determining only the information to be disclosed for 
investors[66]. In this spirit the The Transparency Directive[67] demands a 
half-yearly report from listed companies in the EU, which tends to be 
oriented more towards the Anglo-American spirit of regulation, since only 
essential details are demanded. This mixture of methods for investor 
protection is nicely seen in the General Prospectus Directive, which is 
defining the contents of the prospectus where a listings is sought and only 
vaguely defines the content of information for prospectus where no listing is 
sought. This specific approach can be observed throughout EU company law 
legislation: regulating with more Continental approach public limited 
companies while using the more flexible Anglo-American approach for 
private limited companies. The exception to this rule can maybe be seen in 
the provisions on major shareholdings in Transparency Directive[68], which 
determines the minimum standards for investor protection through the 
information function: the acquirer is under obligation to notify the company 
and the competent authorities on his acquisition and then the company needs 
to disclose this information to the public. But no matter what the legislative 
approach in each of these Directives is, the ones protected with their 
provisions are (potential) shareholders. 
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 And last but not least, the Thirteenth Directive[69] acknowledges the 
fact that the possibility of hostile takeover has considerable advantages for 
shareholders compared to mergers[70], so it protects them by giving them 
exclusive competence on the final decision about the takeover. The Directive 
balances the Anglo-American and Continental legislative approach, by 
protecting minority shareholders in the target company through information 
function at one hand[71] and by determining mandatory bid and its 
transparency through detailed explanation and publication on the other 
hand[72]. In this respect, the balance in the Directive seems to lean more in 
the direction of mandatory rules, if looked at the importance of the 
provisions[73]. Whatever the regulatory principle used, the protective 
principles contained in this Directive seem to focus on three groups of actors 
in company law: the shareholders of the target company[74] and the 
employees of the target and the bidding company[75]. Moreover, the target 
company itself is protected by these provisions so that its business operation 
may be affected to the extent absolutely necessary. Creditors‘ protection here 
is hidden in this latter provision, since the growth and continuance of 
business is of prime importance in these reorganization operations. 
b) The suggestions of secondary EU legislature  
 Under EU company law all limited liability companies are regulated 
mainly for third party relationships, while protection of shareholders and the 
internal structure are harmonized only for public limited liability companies. 
The application of all the harmonization measures seems to be roughly split 
in two groups: measures to protect third parties (mostly creditors)[76] and 
measures for shareholder protection as their main aim[77]. It is nonetheless 
true also shareholder protection can be found also in acts which primarily 
deal with creditor protection; for example in the Second Council Directive 
with rules on mandatory competence of the general meeting for capital 
measures or its pre-emption right of shareholders. This creates an overall 
impression that the creditors or third parties in general enjoy the same level 
of protection with respect to all limited companies, through EU creation of 
confidence in cross-border activities, while shareholder protection is the 
center of EU law rules applying mostly to public limited companies. This 
outcome is achieved through EU use of different regulatory principles, all 
yielding the same result in the end. Although EU Treaties oblige national 
legislators to give the information rules priority over substantive mandatory 
rules[78], the majority of EU company law legislation still entails the 
integration model with minimum harmonization with addition of protection 
of minorities model (again through mandatory rules). Free market hypothesis 
seems to be of lesser importance in the EU than stakeholder protection 
through mandatory rules. 
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Directive)
[73]Mandatory bid, the determination of minimum compensation under the mandatory bid, 
the obligatory period for acceptance, and the takeover report determined through mandatory 
rules 
[74] Under Art.9(2) – Art.9(4) of the Takeover Directive they gain the exclusive competence 
to enact defensive measures during the takeover procedure 
[75]Art.8 of the Takeover Directive 
[76] The First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eight, Eleventh and Twelfth Council Directive 
[77] The Third, Sixth, Tenth and Thirteenth Council Directive 
[78]If those satisfy the need for protection in sufficient amount, see further Grundmann, 
Stefan; Möslein, Florian (2007) European company law. Organization, finance and capital 
markets. Antwerpen, Holmes Beach, Fla.: Intersentia; distribution for North America : 
Gaunt (Ius communitatis series, v. 1), part 7
[79]Which are already inherently present in the EU competition law, see for example 
‗Merger Directive‘, Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
26 October 2005 on cross-border mergers of limited liability companies, OJ L 310 of 
25.11.2005, p. 1
[80]Accompanied with anti-abuse provisions to ensure the EU traditional stakeholder 
protection
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Conclusion 
 Conherency of the EU law system as a whole could be achieved to a 
larger extent? Some reflections and propositions. 
 The majority of the business in the EU is carried out through private 
limited companies, and yet the most detailed mandatory EU company law 
rules relate to public limited liability companies. This tendency can be seen 
as a result of the aim of EU legislator to make EU companies more 
competitive in the world market so it focused its harmonizing legislative 
efforts on existing big EU companies. The incoherency inherent in this 
reasoning is the following: since in EU competition law policy the EU 
clearly shows its preference in maintaining fair competition on the internal 
market and preserving its variety, it does not make much sense legislatively 
coordinating the provisions on the already large companies in the field of 
company law and facilitating their cross-border operations, to the detriment 
of highly non-harmonized field of EU law on private limited companies and 
other company forms covering small and medium-size companies, that could 
be the source of comparative advantage for the EU economy. 
 Therefore next to the already provided equal creditor protection for 
all limited liability companies, providing additional incentives to small and 
medium enterprises to grow in size through cross-border operations would be 
advisable, possibly in the form of more lenient tax treatment, more lenient 
competition law provisions, and more lenient company law provisions with 
unified protective policy. Growth should be stimulated as an EU objective 
and even though this is stated as aim of multiple EU law instruments, a 
private limited liability company wishing to grow and develop its business as 
public limited company, it faces a switch in the regulatory principles and the 
body of applicable law. It goes from information model of regulation to a 
more stringent, Continental integration model, it faces additional rules on 
shareholder protection, more stringent accounting rules and a whole new 
body of EU case law in the field of taxation and Treaty freedoms as well as 
highly harmonized body of capital markets law.  
 Competitiveness today is not in size of production and low prices, it 
is more about the innovation and the price-quality ration. With that in mind, 
besides encouraging EU businesses to gain in size, innovation and quality 
should be rewarded through EU legislation, whether by using information 
and integration model, providing high stakeholder protection as a typical trait 
of Continental heritage. For all types of companies focus should be on 
additional information dissemination to further strengthen the cross-border 
confidence of investors, some transitional provisions for companies changing 
their form into public limited liability company should be provided, also 
provisions for encouraging quality innovations should be envisaged. For 
these provisions to be able to boost competitiveness of the EU economy as a 
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whole, the Member States should voluntarily adopt cooperative attitude in 
relation one to another rather than competing internally; they should strive 
for joint competitiveness with their inherent comparative advantages against 
the rest of the world, using their historic legacies and their combined strength 
to develop new, modern and flexible company law legislation.  
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